In Avicenna's expositions of his theory of the temporal origination of the human rational soul, its ḥudūth, one meets difficulties in understanding of what he actually means. Some of the expressions used are left unexplained and one has to extract their meaning from discussions given in a different context. There are also ambiguities in his use of such terms as al-‘aql al-kulliyy and al-nafs al-kulliyya. Although in one place he makes it clear that these expressions refer to concepts that exist (...) only in the mind, distinguishing them from ‘ aql al-kull and nafs al-kull, the distinction is not uniformly observed. In a number of his works the term ‘‘universal'' is used to refer to both the celestial intellect and the celestial soul. There is also an ambiguity in his statements about the role the celestial soul plays in the emanation of the human rational soul. In some discussions he seems to hold that the rational human soul emanates from both the celestial intellect and the celestial soul. The Metaphysics of al-Shifā' suggests a resolution of this ambiguity. At the same time, there are statements in this work that are left unexplained and one has to look for their explanation in other books of The Healing. Thus questions do arise regarding the details of Avicenna's theory of the temporal origination of the human rational soul. His general exposition of his theory, however, remains comprehensible, its pivotal position within his entire philosophical system clear. (shrink)

The theological foundations of Ghazali's causal theory are fully expressed in the chapter on the attribute of divine power in his al-Iqtiṣād fi al-I'tiqād. The basic doctrine which he proclaims and argues for is that divine power, an attribute additional to the divine essence, is one and pervasive. It does not consist of a multiplicity of powers that produce a multiplicity of effects, but is a unitary direct cause of each and every created existent. In a defense of the doctrine (...) of kasb, Ghazali argues that power in all animate creatures is created directly by God and that there is created with it the object of power, normally, but erroneously regarded as its effect: the object of power is in fact directly created by God. It exists with the created power, but not by it. In his critique of the Mu'tazilite theory of the generated act he again denies that created power has any causal efficacy and denies that inanimate things have any causal efficacy. What one normally regards as the effects of inanimate causes are in reality their concomitants, directly caused by divine power. The discussion of kasb, the longest in the chapter, includes Ghazali's spirited defense of it against possible objections. The defense, however, as will be shown, is not immune against criticism. At the same time, the discussion of kasb, central as it is, has to be understood in the context of the chapter as a whole, whose intricate arguments remain integrated and unified. Hence a brief exposition of the chapter's arguments will first be given, followed by a critical comment on some aspects of Ghazali's defense of kasb. This is then followed by an annotated translation of the entire chapter, a chapter so very basic for the study of Ghazali's position on causality. Les fondements théologiques de la théorie de la causalité chez Ghazali trouvent leur pleine expression dans le chapitre de son al-Iqtiṣād fī al-i'tiqād, portant sur l'attribut de la puissance divine. La doctrine fondamentale qu'il proclame et en faveur de laquelle il plaide, c'est que la puissance divine, attribut qui s'ajoute à l'essence divine, est une et partout présente. Elle ne consiste pas en une multiplicité de pouvoirs produisant une multiplicité d'effets, mais elle est la cause unitaire et immédiate de chaque existant créé. Défendant la doctrine du kasb, Ghazali fait valoir que le pouvoir présent chez les créatures animées est créé directement par Dieu et que se trouve créé, en même temps que ce pouvoir, l'objet sur lequel il s'exerce, objet considéré ordinairement quoique de façon erronée, comme l'effet de ce pouvoir. L'objet de ce pouvoir est, en fait, directement créé par Dieu. Il existe avec le pouvoir cr´, mais non par lui. Dans sa critique de la théorie mu'tazilite de l'acte engendré, Ghazali dénie ā nouveau au pouvoir créé toute efficace causale et refuse de considérer que les réalités inanimées aient une quelconque efficace causale. Ce que l'on considère habituellement comme les effets des causes inanimées sont en réalité leurs concomitants, directement causés par la puissance divine. Dans la discussion du kasb, qui occupe la plus large place dans ce chapitre de l' Iqtiṣād, Ghazali présente une défense passionnée de cette doctrine contre les objections qui pourraient lui être opposées. Cependant, cette défense, comme on le montrera, n'est pas a l'abri de toute critique. Dans le même temps, la discussion du kasb, centrale comme elle est, doit être comprise dans le contexte de ce chapitre pris comme un tout et dont les arguments complexes demeurent intégrés et unifiés. Aussi exposera-t-on d'abord brièvement ces arguments, avant de proposer un commentaire critique de certains aspects de la défense par Ghazali du kasb. Cet exposé et ces remarques critiques sont suivis d'une traduction annotée de l'mtégralité de ce chapitre, si fondamental pour l'étude de la position de Ghazali concernant la causalité. (shrink)